EU nations spend about $170 billion a year on defense, roughly two thirds of the U.S. defense budget. If the money were spent the right way, it would be quite enough to satisfy strategic commitments that are much smaller than American ones. But as seen in Kosovo–where the United States provided nearly 80 percent of air power–it isn’t. Europeans pay billions to maintain manpower levels in excess of any foreseeable threat, while scrimping on procurement, research and operational essentials such as tanker aircraft.
The resulting dependence on the United States is a big impediment to European designs for a common foreign policy, first codified in the 1991 Maastricht Treaty. Last June at the Cologne European Council, EU leaders decided to establish a new decision-making structure for defense matters. Still a work in progress, the structure is meant to give the European Union the military expertise it needs to weigh options in a crisis, and ultimately to initiate military operations. The leaders also agreed to organize an EU defense review to determine how Europe’s defense budgets can be spent more effectively. Leading the process is Javier Solana, who until recently was secretary-general of NATO; he’s expected to make sure that the EU works effectively with the Atlantic alliance.
Ironically, it is Britain, the odd man out in the DASA-Aerospatiale merger, that is mainly responsible for the decisions in Cologne. Last fall Prime Minister Tony Blair effectively dropped the longstanding British objection to the EU assuming defense responsibilities. He also convinced France that Britain seriously desires a more autonomous and capable European Union. The two countries have cooperated intensely in preparing and implementing the Cologne decisions.
It is the Franco-German relationship, however, that remains the most important one for the future of the EU. France and Germany are, after all, the driving force behind the EU’s key project, the euro. A weak Franco-German relationship is bad politics in both countries, and the desire to be seen strengthening ties helps to explain why German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder and French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin jointly and publicly endorsed the DASA-Aerospatiale merger.
Such symbolism matters, because there’s still plenty of potential for discord as the building of the new Europe goes forward. Indeed, one challenge is posed by the new European Aeronautic Defense and Space Co. itself, which may spotlight the increasing disparities in defense spending among the EU countries. Whereas France and the United Kingdom have maintained levels slightly above 2.5 percent of GDP, Germany is in danger of falling below 1.5 percent. A company that’s half German can’t earn the bulk of its defense revenues from French taxpayers without undermining European unity.
But that’s tomorrow’s problem. For today, Europe’s leaders may perhaps be permitted to celebrate a real step toward a more equal transatlantic partnership.
