Frankly, Bauer has a point. But this is not simply a case of Republican double standards. With the White House and Congress in their hands, conservatives have finally realized that they are the party of government. And governing is the realm of reality, compromises, even the occasional “very sorry.”
Let’s not kid ourselves. This is what happened: on the basis of trumped-up charges, the Chinese government made the administration squirm for 11 days and forced several expressions of regret, some of which certainly sounded like apologies. They did this even though the United States had done nothing that violated any international law or was even unusually provocative. American reconnaissance planes have flown that same flight path for decades. What has changed in recent years is the aggressive manner in which Chinese pilots have been hassling them.
And yet praise for the administration is entirely justified. After all, what should it have done? The Chinese government held all the cards. It had the crew and the plane. In these circumstances, to grandstand about national honor and refuse to compromise would have been playing with the lives of 24 Americans–all to gain momentary advantage in a public-relations game. As the administration is demonstrating, once the balance of power shifted–with the crew back home–it can play hardball. Its “regrets” have not translated into any softening of its policy toward Beijing–on the contrary. In the heat of the crisis, however, the White House wisely determined that extracting the crew was its chief objective.
So far Republicans in Congress have supported the administration. They will need to maintain that alliance because China is the one foreign-policy issue that could crack the conservative coalition. During the cold war, the right united under a big tent called “anti-Sovietism.” Various strands of the movement opposed the Soviet Union for different reasons–concern over human-rights abuses, anti-communism, geopolitical competition–but it didn’t really matter; the resulting policy prescriptions were identical. Ideology and strategy pointed in the same direction.
But today’s China is more complicated. The country has a mixed record over the past two decades, liberalizing economically while keeping its nasty apparatus of political repression. As with other authoritarian regimes that went capitalist–Chile, Taiwan, South Korea–the surest way to push Chinese liberalization forward is to encourage Beijing to keep freeing up the economy, enmesh it in global trade and international institutions and keep the world’s attention focused on its human-rights abuses.
But in strategic terms, China and the United States are destined to bump up against one another. Washington correctly believes that it has a role to play in maintaining stability in East Asia and preventing any one power–read China–from dominating. China, on the other hand, believes it should have a rising role in its neighborhood. These two visions could be compatible–if, for example, China doesn’t use force and bullying–but they could easily result in conflict, especially over Taiwan. It will take hardheadedness and diplomacy to keep the peace.
This translates into a strategy toward China of economic cooperation coupled with military deterrence. It is a shrewd policy but it will prove deeply unsatisfying to many conservatives. It lacks the fire of a crusade. For those who yearn for the moral satisfaction of an all-out struggle, it is too (you can hear the sneer) “sophisticated.” But if this approach is complex, it only reflects the world we live in. Take one example: while all of Western Europe wanted the United States to help contain the Soviet Union, no country in East Asia, other than Vietnam, would support such a policy against China. It would have been like trying to contain the Soviet Union with Belgium as your only ally.
Over the past decade American conservatism has shown itself to be ideologically active, politically organized, operationally successful–but ultimately irresponsible. During the 1990s, the GOP became a party of opposition, ready to criticize anything Bill Clinton did, from any angle. But when given the reins itself–in Congress in 1994–it retained its angry minority mentality, railing against the world instead of setting about to patiently mend things. Its leaders talked about revolutions, “counterculture McGovernites,” and shut down the government. (Which led a friend of mine to ask, “Wait a minute, I thought they just became the government?”)
The Bush administration wants to demonstrate that conservatives can get their hands dirty, make deals, handle the political heat and actually govern. So far they’re doing a good job even if they did have to say sorry.
